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IS  IT  TIME  FOR  THE  
END  OF  TYPICALITY?  
Kristin MacDonnell† 
with a Preface by Scott Dodson* 
PREFACE  
Kristin MacDonnell’s terrific paper argues for the interment of the typi-
cality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3). Her argument proceeds by developing 
two propositions. First, the typicality requirement has lost independent 
significance in light of the recent tightening of other class-certification  
requirements, especially by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which has given 
real teeth to the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), and Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, which bolstered Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy require-
ment. Second, the typicality requirement, because it floats between com-
monality and adequacy, has tended to cause substantial confusion in cases 
and commentary, even prompting courts to merge typicality with either 
commonality or adequacy. To alleviate the confusion, Ms. MacDonnell ar-
gues that typicality should be removed from Rule 23(a), and she offers lan-
guage for doing so. Her article is particularly timely in light of the renewed 
focus on class actions by both the Supreme Court and the Rules Committee. 
•  •  • 
INTRODUCTION  
hanges to Rule 23, the Federal Rule governing class actions, have 
generally tracked new developments in multi-party litigation. For 
example, the perception of class actions as a lucrative tool for 
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plaintiffs’ attorneys – unexpected in 1966, when the first major changes to 
Rule 23 were made – led the Rules Committee to adopt a number of 
amendments in 2003 that increased judicial oversight of class action litiga-
tion.1 The Rules Committee continues to refine how Rule 23 governs the 
complex creature that is the class action. It is currently considering two 
proposed changes to Rule 23: the first would amend Rule 23(e)(2) to elim-
inate releases for future conduct in the settlement of class actions;2 the 
second involves a number of changes to the standards governing “no injury” 
cases, certification standards for issue classes, and notice requirements.3  
Despite the Committee’s willingness to adapt Rule 23 to new practical 
realities, the four “threshold requirements” to class certification, set forth 
in Rule 23(a), have remained inviolate since 1966. Granted, courts have 
taken a renewed interest in the Rule 23(a) requirements following the Su-
preme Court’s prescription in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes that a class may 
be certified only when “the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, 
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”4 But so far, that 
judicial attention has not translated into a rule change. As courts attempt 
to sort out the proper criteria for each of the threshold requirements, a 
puzzling question persists: what is the unique role of Rule 23(a)(3)’s typi-
cality requirement? How is it different from commonality or adequacy of 
representation? Courts and scholars have been confused by this question 
since 1966.5  
                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (giving courts managerial authority over class actions with respect 
to timing of certification, notice to class members in mandatory actions, and the ability to create 
subclasses); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (giving courts authority over settlement and voluntary dismissal 
of certified class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requiring courts to appoint class counsel after 
certification). 
2 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL RULES 
SUGGESTIONS DOCKET NO. 14-CV-A, available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules 
/cv-suggestions-2014/ 14-CV-A-suggestion.pdf, archived at perma.cc/9VLJ-GFUL. 
3 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 
CIVIL RULES SUGGESTIONS DOCKET NO. 14-CV-F, available at www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/cv-suggestions-2014/14-CV-F-suggestion.pdf, archived at perma.cc/Y939-BRKC. 
4 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. 
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 See, e.g., White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 414-15 (D. Colo. 1971) (discussing different 
judicial approaches to typicality and finding each insufficient); ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS 
AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL § 3.6A (4th ed. 2012) (“Courts have thus 
struggled to interpret the typicality requirement, resulting in confusion and a lack of consensus.”); 
see also Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. 
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The lack of consensus among the courts as to the meaning of typicality, 
and the concomitant lack of effectiveness of the requirement, suggests that 
typicality is unnecessary in modern procedural practice. This is so for sev-
eral reasons.  
First, the history of the rule suggests that the 1966 Rules Committee 
did not carefully examine the justification for the requirement before in-
cluding it in Rule 23(a). Without a clear rationale, typicality operates at a 
superficial level, ensuring that the class “looks” cohesive by insisting that 
the legal claims of the representative resemble those of the class.  
Second, typicality does not appear to do much to ensure effective class 
representation, especially compared to commonality, adequacy of repre-
sentation, and the requirement of a definable class. These other Rule 23(a) 
requirements more practically address the due process concerns underly-
ing the threshold requirements and have received more attention – and 
therefore have been better developed – by courts in recent years.  
Third, typicality is obsolete in light of a reality already addressed by the 
Rules Committee: that it is class counsel who spur and direct class action 
litigation and, as such, require more judicial oversight.6 The formal re-
quirement that class representatives’ claims be typical is less important 
when one acknowledges that class counsel – not the class members them-
selves – are in need of judicial supervision.  
Finally, typicality leads to confusion: confusion as to why the Rules 
Committee adopted it, confusion as to what independent territory it oc-
cupies in Rule 23(a), and confusion as to how its satisfaction should be 
determined. Confusion is not inherently bad. But when confusion is pro-
voked by a superfluous appendage to the rule, it becomes harmful.  
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the 1966 introduc-
tion of typicality and the other Rule 23(a) requirements, and outlines the 
subsequent attempts by courts and scholars to divine a purpose for typical-
ity. Part II illustrates the superfluity of typicality in light of the other 
                                                                                                         
J.L. REFORM 1097, 1103 (2013) (describing the typicality requirement as “mystifying”). 
6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requiring district courts to appoint class counsel and providing a frame-
work for assessing the appropriateness of class counsel applicants); see also Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991) (“The absence of client 
monitoring raises the specter that the entrepreneurial attorney will serve her own interest at the 
expense of the client.”). 
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threshold requirements and recent trends in class action litigation. Part III 
discusses the harmful effects of the confusion caused by typicality, using a 
recent case as an example. Part IV is a call to action that encourages the 
Rules Committee to excise the requirement and adopt a new, functional 
test that combines the values of typicality with the requirement that repre-
sentation be adequate.  
I.  ORIGINAL  PURPOSE  OF  TYPICALITY  
he Rules Committee introduced typicality, along with the other Rule 
23(a) threshold requirements, to the class action rule in 1966, as part 
of the most comprehensive reform to Rule 23 since its 1938 inception. 
Although the objectives behind the new 23(a) threshold requirements 
were certain enough – courts needed a way to achieve efficiency while 
protecting the due process rights of absent class members7 – the Commit-
tee offered little explanation as to the values that supported the four re-
quirements. Nowhere was judicial uncertainty about the 23(a) require-
ments stronger than with typicality, decried as “a thorn in the side of 
courts and attorneys who deal with class actions.”8 One of the first Su-
preme Court decisions to discuss the newly amended Rule 23 failed to 
discuss the element at all.9 Perhaps the Rules Committee added typicality 
with the intention of reinforcing the other Rule 23(a) requirements. Per-
haps it envisioned an independent purpose for the requirement; if so, the 
Committee left it up to the courts to divine that purpose. Perhaps, 
though, as I argue in this paper, its addition was an attempt to legitimize 
the entire concept of representative litigation as a preclusive device at a 
time when that idea was new and on uncertain ground. Assuming that is 
true, typicality is no longer needed in modern practice, in which the pre-
clusive effect of class actions is widely accepted.10 
 
                                                                                                         
7 See Bone, supra note 5, at 1103 (noting that the 1966 Committee “had to face squarely the due 
process and fairness-to-absentee issues that the 1938 Committee had dodged”). 
8 Wilson v. Anderson Greenwood & Co., No. 76-H-2086, 1979 WL 247, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 
1979). 
9 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
10 See, e.g., Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (“There is of 
course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly 
entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation.”). 
T 
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Recent courts have sought to carve out a distinct role for typicality, but 
with little practical effect. Without a clear original purpose or subsequent 
utility, the persistence of the typicality requirement is merely a source of 
confusion and wasted effort for litigants and the courts.  
A. The 1966 Amendments 
Confusion surrounding the typicality requirement likely originates 
from the uncertain reasons for its inclusion in Rule 23. When the 1966 
Rules Committee introduced the provision, it offered no context or in-
struction apart from the text of the rule itself: “the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class.”11 The Rule provides a formal limitation as to what must be typical: 
the claims or defenses of the class. But the Committee gave no guidance as 
to how typicality was to be assessed, what function it served, or what val-
ues supported it. While the general purpose of the 1966 amendments was 
clear – make the Rule more practically useful – determining how the typi-
cality requirement advanced that purpose has proved elusive. 
Typicality was introduced as part of the overhaul of Rule 23 from a 
highly formal, rights-based classification system12 to a pragmatic, function-
al tool that corresponded to the real-world circumstances that called for 
representative mass litigation in the first place.13 The old Rule 23 did not 
envision the class action as a preclusive device whose primary purpose was 
to achieve judicial efficiency.14 Instead, the class action was an equitable 
                                                                                                         
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
12 The original Rule 23(a) provided only a classification system. It authorized a class action when “the 
character of the right” was (1) “joint, or common, or secondary;” (2) “several, and the object of the 
action [was] the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property;” or (3) “several, 
and there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief 
[was] sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938) (repealed 1966), reprinted in 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23App.01 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014). 
13 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 BOS. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1968): 
The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake the law of class actions free of abstract cate-
gories contrived from such bloodless words as “joint,” “common,” and “several,” and to re-
build that law on functional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for 
mass litigation through representative parties. 
14 Although preclusion and efficiency concerns were not at the forefront of the 1938 rule, class 
actions still had some binding effect. That effect depended on which rights-based category the action 
fit into. Actions involving joint or common rights bound everyone in the class. Actions involving 
several rights and specific property bound class members only with respect to the property at issue. 
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invention of necessity, designed “so that mere numbers would not disable 
large groups of individuals, united in interest, from enforcing their equita-
ble rights.”15 This old conception of the class action had a narrow purpose: 
to allow a lawsuit to continue without joining necessary parties.16 This 
limited view of the device allowed the 1938 drafters to mostly avoid the 
due process and fairness-to-absentee concerns that would become the fo-
cus of the 1966 amendments. 
Concrete policy concerns, rather than the abstract rights described in 
the 1938 version of the rule, undergirded the 1966 revisions.17 Efficiency 
and decisional consistency were at the forefront of the values underlying 
the Rule 23 changes. These policy goals were illustrated by, for example, 
the addition of Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), which respectively authorized 
class actions for cases in which injunctive relief would be impossible or far 
more difficult for courts to grant in individual litigation, or in which 
common questions of law or fact united the class members.18 These 
amendments evinced a new conception of the class action device, one that 
acknowledged the class action as not simply an alternative to joinder, but a 
device that improved efficiency by both allowing aggregation of related 
claims and giving broad preclusive effect to aggregated judgments.  
It was in light of these efficiency considerations that the idea of thresh-
old requirements for class certification arose.19 If judgments in class ac-
tions were to be given preclusive effect, courts needed a way to accurately 
define the class and identify its members, who would be bound by the 
judgment. The Rules Committee recognized that under this new regime, 
district courts would have to supervise class litigation in order to protect 
the interests of absent class members.20 Rule 23(a) provided part of the 
framework for that supervision.  
                                                                                                         
Finally, actions involving several rights and common questions bound only those who chose to 
intervene. See James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions – Jurisdiction and Effect of 
Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, 555-63 (1938). 
15 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948). 
16 See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative 
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 242-45 (1990). 
17 Bone, supra note 5, at 1102. 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)-(3); see also Bone supra note 5, at 1102 (describing how each of the new 
23(b) subdivisions served specific policy goals).  
19 See Bone, supra note 5, at 1103. 
20 See id. (“[The Committee] also responded [to due process concerns] by assigning responsibility to 
the district judge to look out for the interests of absent class members.”). 
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Rule 23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements that a party moving 
for class certification must satisfy in order to maintain a class action. First, 
the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impractica-
ble.”21 Second, there must be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”22 Third, “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must 
be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”23 Fourth and finally, the 
court must determine that “the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.”24 These requirements are collo-
quially referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy 
of representation.25 Rule 23(a)’s four requirements direct the court to 
consider efficiency and due process concerns at an early stage by determin-
ing whether a class action is an expedient and fair way to adjudicate a mass 
dispute.  
From the outset, some of these new requirements made more sense 
than others. Out of the four, Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation 
requirement appears to have been the most intentional. The rule was a 
direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hansberry v. Lee, in 
which the Court held that due process of law is satisfied only if the inter-
ests of absentee class members are adequately represented.26 Rule 
23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement served a practical purpose and merely 
made explicit an implicit requirement of class action practice: that a class 
must be comprised of a sufficient number of individuals such that the more 
simple joinder device is impracticable.  
But the other Rule 23(a) additions did not have such clear functions. 
Those other additions – Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement and 
Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement – appear to have been added with-
out much thought as to what they meant or how their presence was to be 
determined. These elements also appear redundant. As Professor Bone 
notes, the requirements of each 23(b) subdivision already guarantee a 
common question – and 23(b)(3) explicitly requires one – so the addition 
                                                                                                         
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
25 See WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed. 2014). 
26 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not 
present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately 
represented by parties who are present . . . .”).  
KRISTIN  MACDONNELL  
24   5  JOURNAL  OF  LAW  (2  NEW  VOICES)  
of a common question as a threshold requirement seems unnecessary.27 
The typicality requirement also seems unnecessary given the more inten-
tional inclusion of 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation.28 
Surely, the addition of the typicality requirement was part of the 
Committee’s concern for the due process rights of absent class members. 
But there is no evidence that the Committee thought rigorously about how 
the requirement would address that concern. Professor Bone hypothesizes 
that the typicality requirement was rooted in the Committee’s assumption 
that a class had to exhibit internal “homogeneity,” “solidarity,” or “cohe-
sion,” in addition to adequate representation, in order to fairly bind absent 
class members.29 As typicality is a proxy for cohesion, perhaps the Com-
mittee added Rule 23(a)(3) to ensure that a class explicitly satisfied the 
previously assumed cohesion requirement. But this explanation does little 
to increase the utility of the requirement because neither the language of 
23(a)(3) nor the Committee’s understanding of “cohesion” was set forth in 
functional terms.30 Rather, by restricting typicality to the similarity of le-
gal claims, the Committee couched the requirement in the old formalism 
that characterized the pre-1966 Rule 23. Perhaps the Committee recog-
nized the redundancy of the typicality requirement and so restricted the 
element to legal claims or defenses. If typicality could be established by 
some other standard – such as class members having suffered a similar in-
jury – it would be so obviously duplicative of the commonality require-
ment as to be meaningless.  
The Committee’s reasons for adding typicality were more likely about 
appearance than substance. A typicality requirement lent legitimacy to the 
unsettling concept of mass litigation that could potentially preclude the 
related legal claims of thousands of people.31 The preclusive nature of class 
                                                                                                         
27 Bone, supra note 5, at 1103 n.28.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 1104 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, subdivision (b)(3) (1966) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 380 (1967)). 
30 Indeed, Professor Bone notes that although the Committee may have considered “cohesion” a 
requirement for a class action, that principle is at odds with Rule 23(b)(1) limited fund actions, 
which “inherently pit[] one class member against the others” as they compete for shares of a limited 
fund. Bone, supra note 5, at 1104 n.34. 
31 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:28 (describing how typicality “mirrors the requirement that a 
political representative be a member of the polity she is elected to represent,” and noting that this 
“may add a degree of legitimacy to the representation”). 
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actions was at odds with “the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and 
on behalf of the individual named parties only.”32 By requiring that the 
class representative possess claims similar to those of the class, typicality 
ensured that a class appeared cohesive and well suited to have its claims 
adjudicated en masse. Despite the salutary effect of this appearance, the 
resulting confusion surrounding typicality underscored its lack of inde-
pendent substantive relevance. Whatever typicality’s meaning, the 1966 
Rules Committee left it to the courts to divine.  
B. Judicial and Scholarly Developments 
Early courts concluded that the typicality requirement was intended to 
reinforce the other Rule 23(a) requirements33 – the implication being that 
it had no independent meaning. In an early treatise, Professor Moore even 
went so far as to conclude that “there appears to be little or no need for 
this [typicality] clause, since all meanings attributable to it duplicate re-
quirements prescribed by other provisions in Rule 23.”34 But more recent-
ly, and guided by the canon of interpretation that portions of a statute 
should not be rendered meaningless,35 scholars and courts have sought to 
carve out a distinct role for typicality. 
In a leading modern treatise, Professor Rubenstein maintains that typi-
cality “harnesses selfishness as a means to accomplish altruistic ends.”36 A 
plaintiff is bound to pursue her own self-interest in litigation, even if she 
purports to represent others. By insisting that her claims align with those 
of the class, typicality ensures that the plaintiff’s pursuit of her self-interest 
also advances the interests of absent class members. This is not precisely 
the same as adequacy of representation. Though both typicality and ade-
quacy of representation are rooted in the due process rights of unnamed 
                                                                                                         
32 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979). 
33 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (“[T]he typical repre-
sentative element in Rule 23(a)(3) is designed to buttress the fair representation requirement in 
Rule 23(a)(4).”). 
34 Wilcox v. Petit, 117 F.R.D. 314, 317-18 (D. Maine 1987) (quoting 3B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 23.06-2 (2d ed. 1987)). 
35 See, e.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993) (“We generally avoid construing one provision 
in a statute so as to suspend or supersede another provision. To avoid denying effect to a part of a 
statute, we accord significance and effect to every word.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
36 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:28. 
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class members, they tackle the issue differently. Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy 
requirement addresses due process concerns directly by inquiring whether 
the representative has conflicts of interest with class members and is able 
to pursue the litigation with enthusiasm and knowledge.37 The typicality 
requirement, on the other hand, addresses due process concerns indirectly 
by relying on the “inherent logic” that a class will necessarily benefit from 
the representative’s pursuit of her own claims if her claims are sufficiently 
similar to those of the class.38  
These theoretical differences are of limited utility to the courts, who 
must devise functional tests to determine whether typicality is satisfied. 
The tests that have emerged tend to be functionally similar to either com-
monality or adequacy of representation, or both. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit says that “[t]he test of typicality is whether other members have the 
same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not 
unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have 
been injured by the same course of conduct.”39 Other circuit courts em-
ploy similar tests.40 It is hard to see how tests such as the Ninth Circuit’s 
address problems that the commonality requirement – especially in the 
more exacting form demanded after Dukes41 – or the adequacy require-
ment do not already cover. Indeed, where typicality has been invoked as a 
bar to class certification, the same outcome would have been the likely 
result under a commonality, adequacy of representation, or Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance analysis.42 
                                                                                                         
37 See id.; Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299, 314 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that the 
inquiry into adequacy of the proposed class representative examines both “the class representatives’ 
willingness and ability to serve” and “conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class 
they seek to represent” (citation omitted)). It also bears mentioning that 23(a)(4) is a basis for as-
sessing adequacy of class counsel; now that inquiry is also encompassed in Rule 23(g).  
38 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:28. 
39 Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hanon 
v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
40 Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2006); Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter 
R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001); James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 571 (5th Cir. 
2001); Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1977). 
41 Dukes’s stringent commonality standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that class members 
have “suffered the same injury,” that class claims “depend upon a common contention,” and that the 
common contention be of a nature that is “capable of classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,at 2551 (2011). 
42 See, e.g., Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirm-
ing the lower court’s holding that a class action was barred on the basis of both the typicality and 
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In sum, the 1966 amendments did little to explain the reasons behind 
the typicality requirement or the goals that it was meant to serve. Subse-
quent scholarly and judicial attempts to divine a meaning for typicality 
have been fruitful only to the extent that conceptual distinctions have 
emerged. These distinctions are of little practical import because other, 
better-developed aspects of Rule 23 practice address the due process con-
cerns that underlie the requirement of typicality. It seems time, then, to 
examine the superfluity of typicality and consider its abolition.  
II.  THE  CURRENT  SUPERFLUITY  OF  TYPICALITY  
he persistence of typicality in modern practice is unnecessary for three 
primary reasons. First, it is unclear whether the typicality requirement 
actually promotes effective litigation. Second, other threshold require-
ments of Rule 23(a) more effectively address the concerns that underlie 
typicality. Third and finally, typicality is obsolete in light of two modern 
trends in class action practice that have received recent attention from the 
Rules Committee: (1) the fact that most class actions, as with individual 
litigation, settle; and (2) that it is class counsel, not class members them-
selves, who spur and direct class litigation and therefore require more judi-
cial oversight. This section addresses each of these problems in turn.  
A. The Dubious Effectiveness of Typicality 
By requiring that the class representative possess claims that are typical 
of the class, the typicality requirement assumes that the individual best 
suited to represent the class is the one who is most similar to the rest of 
the class members. But it is not necessarily true – in either history or in 
litigation – that the best advocate for a group is one of its own members. 
As Professor Rubenstein aptly notes in illustrating this point, wealthy indi-
viduals have championed the rights of the poor; men the rights of women; 
whites the rights of blacks.43 This is true not only of social movements. 
                                                                                                         
adequacy requirements); see generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, §§ 3:31-32 (discussing overlap of 
typicality with commonality and adequacy of representation). 
43 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:28 (“Senator Edward Kennedy, for instance, was a well-known 
advocate for the poor although hailing from a wealthy family; John Stuart Mill, a famous male femi-
nist; a white man, William Lloyd Garrison, a leading American proponent of the abolition of Afri-
can slavery in the United States.”). 
T 
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Effective, enthusiastic proponents for any cause – especially in the rela-
tively impersonal context of litigation – need not be the ones who are 
most “typical” of group members. For example, in litigation involving 
trusts, the actions of the trustee as to the trust will bind beneficiaries. But 
courts do not preliminarily inquire as to whether the trustee and the bene-
ficiaries share the same legal interests.44 Indeed, the very concept of legal 
representation assumes that the best advocate for an injured person is not 
necessarily someone who has experienced the injury firsthand. It therefore 
seems an arbitrary and untrue assumption that the best measure of effec-
tiveness of a group representative is her “typicality.”  
Moreover, the concerns that likely undergirded the Rules Committee’s 
addition of typicality are no longer at issue in modern practice. As dis-
cussed above, typicality lent legitimacy to the general idea of representa-
tive litigation, but appeared to have little practical purpose. Numerosity 
and commonality, by ensuring that the class contained a sufficient number 
of connected individuals, advanced judicial economy. Adequacy of repre-
sentation, especially with its connection to the Hansberry case, explicitly 
ensured that class members were accorded due process. Only typicality 
appeared to be without a functional home, tacked on as an extension of 
adequacy to assure class members that their leader was “one of them,” de-
spite the fact that their claims were being aggregated and adjudicated to-
gether in the name of efficiency. 
Now, however, the idea of the class action as an efficiency device is 
well established in American jurisprudence45 and no longer needs symbolic 
reinforcement of its legitimacy. Furthermore, the modern reality is that 
most potential class members have only an attenuated interest in the out-
come of the litigation – indeed, potential members may not even realize 
that the harm giving rise to the claims has occurred.46 The idea that such a 
disjointed group requires a leader to champion its interests manifests a 
rather romanticized notion of representative litigation that is at odds with 
                                                                                                         
44 Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1849, 1856 (1998) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311 (1950)). 
45 E.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 402 (2010) (stat-
ing that Rule 23 is “designed to further procedural fairness and efficiency”). 
46 See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 
EMORY L.J. 399, 413 (2014) (summarizing critiques of the class action device and noting that “in 
many cases class members may not even know that they have been harmed, may not care about 
minor injuries, and may be entirely disinterested in pursuing litigation”). 
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reality.47 Instead, the class representative should be the individual (from 
among those who have suffered the same harm as the rest of the class 
members, criteria addressed in Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement) 
who is most knowledgeable, capable, and available – criteria addressed in 
Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of representation requirement.  
A final illustration of the doubtful effectiveness of typicality lies in the 
method by which the most typical representative is selected. If typicality 
truly were an important indicator of the effectiveness of a putative repre-
sentative, one would think that the representative would be elected by the 
class members or appointed by the court. But this is not how it works. In-
stead, the class representative is simply the person – almost always selected 
by the plaintiffs’ attorney – who files a complaint and moves for class certi-
fication. The court only assesses this selection after the fact, on the motion 
for class certification. In practice, then, the typicality requirement works 
not as a way of ensuring the most effective representative, but as a “check 
[on] counsel’s zeal by forcing them to find a class member to represent the 
class prior to bringing suit to redress an alleged wrong.”48 It is true that class 
counsel, and not class members themselves, usually initiate class litigation.49 
The selection of counsel, therefore, requires more judicial oversight than 
the selection of a class representative. But typicality is not the way to ac-
complish this oversight. Other, more effective checks built into Rule 23 
directly address that problem. For example, courts have long used Rule 
23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement to ensure not only the adequacy of class 
representatives, but also the adequacy of class counsel.50 And Rule 23(g), 
added in 2003, more explicitly directs the trial court to ensure that class 
counsel will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”51 
                                                                                                         
47 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:28 (noting that, in practice, “it is class counsel, not class rep-
resentatives, who generally direct class actions, and they typically select the class’s representatives 
rather than the class’s representatives seeking them out.”). 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative, and not the 
named parties, who direct and manage these actions.”); Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of 
Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 927 (1998) (“[C]lass representatives often are recruited by class 
counsel, play no client role whatsoever, and – when deposed to test the adequacy of representation 
– commonly show no understanding of their litigation.”). 
50 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:52. 
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
KRISTIN  MACDONNELL  
30   5  JOURNAL  OF  LAW  (2  NEW  VOICES)  
It is unclear, therefore, what role typicality plays in ensuring effective 
class litigation. The only unique role that might have existed for the re-
quirement in 1966 – legitimizing class litigation by requiring the repre-
sentative to be a “leader” of the group – has become obsolete in the cur-
rent legal landscape. As discussed further below, there is no longer any 
need to subscribe to the fiction that the best representative is the one most 
typical of the class. Other, more developed aspects of Rule 23 ensure that 
the class representative – the named class member acting through counsel 
– zealously pursues the class’s interests such that a binding, preclusive 
judgment comports with due process.  
B. Other Threshold Requirements 
Early courts struggled with the typicality requirement. Some treated it 
as synonymous with the commonality requirement.52 Others saw it as syn-
onymous with the adequacy of representation requirement.53 Still others 
attempted to give it an independent meaning by finding that it required an 
absence of any conflict between the interests of the plaintiff and others in 
the class54 – but of course, as noted by one court,55 this interpretation is 
essentially the same as the adequacy of representation requirement. In 
more recent years, courts have assessed typicality by inquiring whether the 
named representative suffered the same type of injury or was subjected to 
the same type of conduct by the defendant.56 These formulations, howev-
                                                                                                         
52 See, e.g., Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 247 (D. Conn. 1970) (finding typicality 
not satisfied because of the unique factual and legal nature of plaintiff’s claims). 
53 See, e.g., Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting class certification 
because, among other things, “there [were] no apparent substantial conflicts of interest or legal 
positions to be advanced within the class,” and not discussing typicality at all); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 
F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. Va. 1970) (finding there was “no doubt” that typicality was satisfied, but 
discussing only adequacy of representation). 
54 See, e.g., Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of Am., 43 F.R.D. 465, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding 
the class representative’s claims to be typical because “his interests [were] not antagonistic to those 
of the class”); Cannon v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing Mersay 
for the idea that “representatives must not have interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those 
they seek to represent.”).  
55 White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 414-15 (1971). 
56 See, e.g., Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 
test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is 
based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members 
have been injured by the same course of conduct.”) (quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 
F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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er, essentially boil down to the same inquiry as commonality, especially as 
that requirement was formulated in Dukes.57 Thus, with adequacy of repre-
sentation, commonality, and the requirement of a definable class covering 
much of the same ground as typicality, typicality appears to have little in-
dependent meaning.  
1. Falcon and the Early Erosion of Typicality 
An early hint of typicality’s lack of independent utility came in the Su-
preme Court’s 1982 decision in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. 
Falcon, in which the Court reversed a certification order concerning a class 
of Mexican-Americans claiming employment discrimination.58 The class 
representative in Falcon was a Mexican-American who was allegedly de-
nied a promotion on the basis of race.59 He sought to represent a class of 
other Mexican-Americans who had been or might be denied either em-
ployment or promotion because of the employer’s discriminatory practic-
es.60 The Court held that the named representative’s claims were atypical 
because his claims only involved the denial of promotion, and that the dis-
trict court erred in “fail[ing] to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the 
named plaintiff’s plea that he is a proper class representative under Rule 
23(a).”61 In making this determination, the Court acknowledged that “the 
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge,” 
and that, “[t]hose requirements [] also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-
representation requirement.”62  
Falcon was hardly a direct blow to typicality. Although the Court 
blended the typicality and commonality analyses, it focused more heavily 
on typicality, even appearing to treat commonality as if it were an initial 
                                                                                                         
57 See supra note 41. 
58 457 U.S. 147, 150-51, 161 (1982). 
59 Id. at 149. 
60 Id. at 150-1. 
61 Id. at 160. 
62 Id. at 157 n.13: 
[B]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances 
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the 
class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and ad-
equately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with 
the adequacy-of-representation requirement . . . . 
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step in assessing typicality.63 And lower courts treated Falcon as a directive 
regarding typicality.64 Still, the long-term effect of Falcon on the decline of 
typicality’s importance was substantial. As Professor Spencer maintains, 
“the shadow of the typicality concern [in Falcon] permitted the freestanding 
commonality requirement to be subsumed and enlarged simultaneously.”65 
Falcon provided the language of commonality that Justice Scalia would 
eventually seize on in Dukes to strengthen the commonality requirement in 
such a way that it overshadowed the typicality requirement.66 The Court’s 
acknowledgment in Falcon – and, later, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor67 – 
that the Rule 23(a) requirements merge paved the way for the gradual ero-
sion of typicality through the enlargement of other Rule 23(a) threshold 
requirements. In the modern procedural landscape, the development of 
adequacy of representation, commonality, and even the “unspoken” re-
quirement of a definable class far outpace typicality. These trends suggest 
that typicality lacks independent meaning. 
2. Overlap with Adequacy of Representation 
The adequacy of representation requirement contained in Rule 23(a)(4) 
insists that representative parties “fairly and adequately protect the inter-
                                                                                                         
63 See id. at 158-59 (“Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that 
were common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought to represent, it 
was error for the District Court to presume that respondent’s claim was typical of other claims 
against petitioner . . . .”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and 
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 468-9 (2013) (stating that Falcon “treated commonality 
as if it were merely instrumental to determining typicality”). 
64 See, e.g., Wakefield v. Monsanto Co., 120 F.R.D. 112, 116 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (“[C]onsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Falcon, the typicality requirement is not always satisfied by suits 
alleging broad-based racial discrimination.”). 
65 Spencer, supra note 63, at 468. 
66 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-
58) (internal quotation marks omitted): 
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that he has been denied a 
promotion [or higher pay] on discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported alle-
gation that the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of 
persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s 
claim and the class claim will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual’s 
claim will be typical of the class claims. 
For a more thorough history of how the commonality requirement came to be infused with the 
“same injury” requirement, see Spencer, supra note 63, at 464-68. 
67 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997). 
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ests of the class.”68 The touchstone of the adequacy inquiry is whether the 
representative has an irreconcilable conflict of interest or is otherwise in-
competent to represent the class.69 Typicality overlaps with adequacy in 
that both inquiries require the court to consider the due process implica-
tions of allowing a class representative to press claims that are not the 
same as – or in conflict with – the claims of class members. Many courts 
address the typicality and adequacy of representation together because of 
their related nature.70 But even when courts address the two inquiries sep-
arately and invoke typicality as a bar to class certification, the same out-
come would occur under an adequacy of representation analysis.  
A Seventh Circuit case, Retired Chicago Police Association v. City of Chica-
go, illustrates this overlap.71 In the case, an association of retired Chicago 
police officers (“RCPA”) and other municipal pension-fund groups sued 
the city alleging due process and equal protection violations when the city 
entered settlement agreements that altered the terms of the groups’ health 
care coverage.72 The plaintiffs also alleged breach of contract and estoppel 
claims based on the City’s promise that they would have lifetime health 
coverage at unchanged rates.73 The district court determined that the class 
– composed of the RCPA and three other pension-fund groups – satisfied 
numerosity and commonality, but not typicality or adequacy of represen-
tation.74 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed, stating with regard to the 
breach of contract and reliance claims that “[i]t is not known whether the 
communications allegedly made by the City and the Funds to each group of 
city employees regarding the health care plan were identical.”75 Accordingly, 
RCPA’s claims were not typical “[b]ecause the RCPA [did] not include 
                                                                                                         
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
69 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:58. 
70 See, e.g., In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 22-23 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating that 
the “primary focus of the typicality analysis is the functional question of whether the putative class 
representative can fairly and adequately pursue the interests of the absent class members without 
being sidetracked by her own particular concerns” and that, as a result, typicality and adequacy can 
be “addressed jointly” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); In re BP, PLC Sec. Litig., 758 F. 
Supp. 2d 428, 437-39 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (considering typicality and adequacy together given the 
relatedness of the inquiries). 
71 7 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 1993). 
72 Id. at 589-90. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 596. 
75 Id. at 597 (emphasis in original). 
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individuals from all of the fund groups and there [was] no indication that 
each of the groups was treated identically.”76  
But the court then went on to assess the adequacy of representation, 
and for largely the same reasons determined that it had not been met. 
Supporting its conclusion, the court noted that individuals who had actual-
ly benefitted from the City’s settlement were included in the putative 
class, and that RCPA’s executive secretary had a conflict of interest be-
cause of his participation in and approval of the disputed settlements.77 
Though the court discussed typicality and adequacy of representation sepa-
rately, the substance of its analysis belied the distinction between the two. 
For instance, the court’s finding that “the scope of the proposed RCPA 
class was not restricted to those members whose premiums had increased 
under the City’s health care plan”78 applied to its assessment of inadequacy 
of representation, but just as easily could have been the basis for a denial of 
certification due to lack of typicality.79 
It could be that the overlap between typicality and adequacy of repre-
sentation evinces only what Professor Rubenstein calls a “stylistic [prefer-
ence] regarding the structure of the opinion or order.”80 But the substance 
of the courts’ reasoning – as illustrated by the RCPA case, in which the 
inquiries were stylistically separate – suggests a more serious underlying 
problem: the two inquiries are the same. 
In a more recent case, Schlaud v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit made this sub-
stantive overlap apparent by analyzing only the adequacy of representation 
requirement but stating that its analysis “could also be expressed in terms 
of commonality or typicality.”81 In Schlaud, a class of home childcare provid-
ers sued their union for violation of their First Amendment rights to free 
association by compelling the collection of dues in support of the union.82 
                                                                                                         
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 598. 
78 Id. 
79 See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (finding typicality 
lacking in another ERISA case because “the named plaintiffs could not advance the interests of the 
entire early retiree class”). 
80 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:32. 
81 717 F.3d 451, 457 n.4 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2899 (2014) 
(mem.). In support of this statement, the Court cited Amchem and Falcon and their statement that 
the adequacy, commonality, and typicality requirements “tend to merge.” Id. 
82 Id. at 455. 
IS  IT  TIME  FOR  THE  END  OF  TYPICALITY?  
NUMBER  1  (2015)   35  
The district court denied certification of the class, which the plaintiffs’ 
complaint defined as all individuals who were home childcare providers in 
the state of Michigan and had any union dues or fees deducted from the 
subsidy paid to them by the state.83 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower 
court that there was a conflict of interest between the named representa-
tives – who opposed union representation – and over 4,000 individuals in 
the proposed class who had voted in favor of the collective bargaining 
agreement and the dues deduction.84 The lower court also found the class 
representatives inadequate when the plaintiffs tried to refine the class defi-
nition to include only childcare providers who had union dues collected 
and who had neither voted for the union nor signed authorization cards.85 
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that it could not “simply 
assume that non-voting providers are hostile to [u]nion representation.”86 
Adequacy of representation was the only Rule 23(a) requirement addressed 
by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, but the court noted that its adequacy analysis 
“could also be expressed in terms of [either] commonality or typicality.”87 
It is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit meant that the tests for typicality, 
commonality, and adequacy are identical, although that is what the footnote 
seems to suggest. Earlier decisions from the circuit envisioned a unique 
role for typicality.88 But, as with other formulations, the practical effect of 
any distinction is limited and attempts to devise a unique role for typicality 
tend to collapse into other, better-defined requirements like commonality 
and adequacy. The Schlaud decision’s seemingly innocuous footnote could 
very well portend the end of typicality. 
3. Overlap with Commonality 
Typicality also overlaps with Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, 
which mandates that there exist “questions of law or fact common to the 
                                                                                                         
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 458. 
85 Id. at 456. 
86 Id. at 456, 459.  
87 Id. at 457 n.4. 
88 See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir. 1996) (issuing a writ of mandamus 
directing the district court to decertify a class for, among other reasons, failing to engage in a suffi-
ciently rigorous inquiry into the existence of typicality even though each of the named plaintiffs had 
used a different model of the product at issue and complained of different injuries). 
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class.”89 Both inquiries require a court to determine whether the class rep-
resentative’s case shares meaningful similarities with that of the class 
members. As with adequacy, some courts jointly discuss the typicality and 
commonality requirements because they are so similar.90 A prisoners’ 
rights case, Hassine v. Jeffes, exemplifies this approach.91 In that case, the 
Third Circuit discussed commonality and typicality under a single heading, 
concluding that the class representatives’ allegations of double-bunking, 
water leaking, and food poisoning meant that the prisoners “demonstrated 
the commonality of their claims with the claims of the class that they 
sought to represent.”92 Having determined that their claims were united 
by a common question of law or fact, the court deemed the typicality re-
quirement also satisfied.93 Other courts have done the same.94 
As with adequacy, scholars and courts can devise theoretical distinc-
tions between typicality and commonality. For one, the commonality 
standard is broad and looks to the interrelatedness of the class as a whole. 
Its requirements, at least historically, were minimally stringent and easily 
met in that only a single common question of law or fact was needed to 
unite class members’ claims.95 The typicality standard, on the other hand, 
is narrow, concerning itself only with the relatedness of the class repre-
sentative to the class as a whole. Perhaps, then, because typicality is a 
“slightly more exacting screen than [commonality],”96 there is a unique 
role for the typicality requirement. Surely there are situations in which 
commonality is satisfied but typicality is not. The RCPA case discussed 
above is one such example. There, the groups shared common questions 
of law or fact, but the representative’s claims were not typical of the 
class’s. But considering commonality and adequacy together, it is hard to 
see what ground typicality covers that those two do not. If commonality 
                                                                                                         
89 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
90 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:31. 
91 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988). 
92 Id. at 177-78. 
93 See id. 
94 E.g., Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Servs., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00420-BRW, 2012 WL 1377052, at *2-3 
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2012); Holman v. Macon Cnty., No. 2:10-00036, 2011 WL 252969, at *4-5 
(M.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2011); Susan J. v. Riley, 254 F.R.D. 439, 459-61 (M.D. Ala. 2008). 
95 See, e.g., J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Baby Neal ex 
rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994)) (“Because the [commonality] requirement may 
be satisfied by a single common issue, it is easily met.”).  
96 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, § 3:31. 
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ensures that there are meaningful common questions among all class 
members, then it is necessarily true that any class representative chosen 
from that class will share at least some of the concerns of the class – and 
likely possess similar claims and defenses as class members. And if, in the 
absence of the typicality requirement, there were any doubt that a class 
representative would press for claims not shared by the rest of the class, 
then as in RCPA or Schlaud, the adequacy of representation requirement 
and its concerns regarding conflicts of interest would bar that individual 
from continuing as the representative. Taking commonality and adequacy 
together, then, it appears that the typicality occupies no independent terri-
tory and exists as merely a superfluous appendage to Rule 23. 
This is especially true in light of the Supreme Court’s tightening of the 
commonality standard in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.97 Prior to Dukes, 
federal courts characterized the necessary showing for commonality as 
“minimal.”98 The common questions needed to be germane and to advance 
the litigation and little more.99 With this permissive, broad standard gov-
erning commonality, typicality – a more exacting standard – made much 
more sense as an independent requirement. Now, however, Dukes man-
dates a far more stringent commonality showing. Dukes’ new commonality 
standard is threefold. First, the plaintiff class members must “have suffered 
the same injury.”100 Second, the common question must be “central to the 
validity of each one of the claims.”101 Third, the determination of the 
common question must resolve a central issue “in one stroke” by “gen-
erat[ing] common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”102 
                                                                                                         
97 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-52 (2011). 
98 See Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 211 F.R.D. 228, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“[T]he commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is usually a minimal burden for a party to shoul-
der . . . .”); see also Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(“The test for commonality is not demanding . . . .”). 
99 Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“It is not every 
common question that will suffice, however; at a sufficiently abstract level of generalization, almost 
any set of claims can be said to display commonality. What we are looking for is a common issue 
the resolution of which will advance the litigation.”). 
100 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
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Regardless of how one views the validity of these new requirements,103 
it is clear that they go much farther than the earlier conception of com-
monality in demanding a common question. Far from the minimal, per-
missive standard of yesterday, the new Dukes standard, by requiring a cen-
tral common question that will drive the resolution of the litigation, pro-
vides the “exacting screen” that was previously the domain of typicality. 
After Dukes, not just any common question of fact will do. For example, in 
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
certification of a class of children in long-term foster care who sued three 
Texas officials for systemic deficiencies in the administration of conserva-
torships.104 The district court found that the common question of fact was 
“whether Defendants failed to maintain a caseworker staff of sufficient size 
and capacity to perform properly.”105 But the Fifth Circuit reversed this 
determination because it “contained no reference to any of the three caus-
es of action advanced on behalf of the proposed class.”106  
After Dukes, then, the commonality requirement is far more substantial 
than before. There must be a nexus between the common question and 
the causes of action alleged by the class members, and that nexus must 
further “drive the resolution of the litigation.” With such an exacting 
screen for commonality, it is now far more likely that the 23(a)(2) re-
quirement alone will ensure that a class representative advances the claims 
of the class. After Dukes, plaintiff classes are also likely to be smaller to 
ensure that they meet the more stringent requirement. This trend further 
guarantees that a class representative does not impermissibly purport to 
represent sprawling, disparate claims. 
4. The Requirement of a Definable Class 
Although not an explicit Rule 23(a) threshold requirement, the implicit 
requirement of a definable class further serves the same values as typicality. 
Courts have justified this judicially created requirement as inherent in the 
                                                                                                         
103 See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 776 (2013) 
(“The majority decision in Dukes cannot be squared with the text, structure, or history of Rule 
23(a)(2). Nothing in the text of Rule 23(a)(2), or in the Advisory Committee Notes thereto, requires 
that the common question be central to the outcome.”). 
104 675 F.3d 832, 835, 849 (5th Cir. 2012). 
105 Id. at 841 (quoting M.D. v. Perry, no. c-11-84, 2011 WL 2173673, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 Id. 
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structure of Rule 23 and therefore an “axiomatic” part of class certifica-
tion.107 Although relatively few cases turned on the adequacy of the class 
definition prior to 2000,108 since then, a significant number of courts have 
invoked it as part of the reason for denying class certification.109 These 
courts tend to reject broad, sweeping class definitions, such as the one 
proposed in Brazil v. Dell, Inc.: “California persons or entities who pur-
chased Dell computer products that [defendant] falsely advertised.”110  
Though not all circuits follow this trend,111 those that do often meld the 
analysis of a definable class with the requirements of Rule 23(a), including 
typicality. For example, in Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s grant of class certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) 
ERISA class defined as “those plan participants and beneficiaries whose long-
term disability benefits were denied or terminated after being subjected to 
any of the practices alleged in the [c]omplaint.”112 The court rejected the 
class definition as indefinite and requiring “individualized fact-finding.”113 
These same concerns meant that “the typicality premise [was] lacking” be-
cause “it [could not] be said that a class member who prove[d] his own claim 
would necessarily [have] prove[n] the claims of other class members.”114  
The additional standard of definability, then, works in tandem with 
commonality to ensure that the class is tightly defined and closely related. 
                                                                                                         
107 See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is axiomatic that for a class 
action to be certified a ‘class’ must exist.”); see also DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (“It is elementary that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be repre-
sented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”). 
108 See, e.g., 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1760 (3d ed. 2011) 
(noting the “liberal judicial attitude toward defining the class” and that “it normally is not essential 
to delimit its membership with a high degree of precision at the class-certification stage”). 
109 See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-94 (3d Cir. 2012); Williams v. 
Oberon Media, Inc., 468 F. App’x 768, 770 (9th Cir. 2012); Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., 
385 F. App’x 423, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2009).  
110 585 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The court rejected the class definition as an 
impermissible fail-safe class – that is, a class defined in terms of the defendant’s liability. Id. 
111 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 695 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting the fail-safe class prohibition and holding that a class is appropriately defined where the 
class members “are linked by [a] common complaint, and the possibility that some may fail to prevail 
on their individual claims will not defeat class membership”). 
112 385 F. App’x 423, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
113 See id. (finding that the only way to determine whether a given class member’s claims were 
improperly denied was “to engage in individualized fact-finding,” and that “the need for such indi-
vidualized fact-finding [made] the district court’s class definition unsatisfactory”). 
114 Id. at 431-32. 
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Often, and as in Romberio, definability underscores the typicality require-
ment and addresses many of the same concerns. The recent tendency of 
district courts to bolster definability – and not typicality – further illus-
trates the waning significance of the latter.  
C. Recent Trends 
Two major trends have emerged in class action practice since the Rule 
23 amendments in 1966. These trends illustrate the most pressing con-
cerns regarding class action litigation, and the responses to them further 
illustrate the obsolescence of typicality as a way of ensuring that the due 
process rights of unnamed class members are protected. 
The first trend is the tendency of most class actions to settle. Often, as 
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, plaintiffs and defendants will approach 
the court jointly with a settlement plan prior to class certification.115 
While such settlements may be beneficial in that they reduce overall costs, 
they risk compromising the claims of absent class members, who do not 
participate in settlement negotiations. Class action settlements present 
unique issues of collusion and conflicts of interest. As Professor Klonoff 
points out, “it is not uncommon for class counsel and defense counsel to 
join forces in support of a settlement in the face of strong objections by 
intervening class members.”116  
Before Amchem, there was a question as to whether the Rule 23(a) re-
quirements needed to be met for a settlement-only class. Amchem an-
swered that question in the affirmative, holding that the requirements of 
Rule 23 – including 23(a) – ”demand undiluted, even heightened, atten-
tion in the settlement context.”117 The Rules Committee corroborated this 
ruling a few years later in 2003 by amending Rule 23(e) to strengthen the 
process by which trial judges review and accept settlement plans. The 
amendments set forth a complex scheme for effecting notice to class 
members, and, among other things, authorize the court to refuse to ap-
prove a settlement unless the settlement affords class members a new op-
portunity to request exclusion in 23(b)(3) classes.118  
                                                                                                         
115 521 U.S. 591, 601-02 (1997). 
116 KLONOFF, supra note 5, § 9:1. 
117 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. 
118 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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Notably, courts and the Rules Committee could have looked to typical-
ity to address some of the class action settlement concerns. They could 
have required deeper scrutiny of the class representative to ensure that her 
claims were sufficiently typical to warrant her presence at the negotiating 
table on behalf of the rest of the class. But courts and the Rules Commit-
tee overlooked this possibility, instead choosing to address class action 
settlement concerns independently. While there may be disagreement 
about the wisdom of this result, the outcome illustrates the declining rele-
vance of typicality in addressing modern class action concerns.  
The second major trend in class litigation is district courts’ tendency to 
require a heightened showing of the Rule 23(a) requirements at the certi-
fication stage – a trend that became law with Dukes119 and, later, Comcast 
Corp. v. Behrend.120 This trend is related to the first one in that the require-
ment of a heightened showing at the certification stage is, in major part, 
intended to alleviate the pressure on defendants to settle that comes with 
the specter of class certification.121  
Undergirding both of these trends is a distrust of plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
who have been widely criticized as “entrepreneurial”122 and as abusing the 
class action device for their own gain.123 But to the extent that courts have 
tightened up Rule 23(a) requirements in order to alleviate this pressure on 
defendants to settle, the typicality requirement does very little work. The 
requirement is premised on the antiquated notion that it is the named 
plaintiffs – not their attorneys – who initiate class action lawsuits and who 
therefore require judicial oversight. As discussed earlier, that notion is 
almost entirely fictitious.124 Typicality, then, seeks to control a nonexistent 
problem. 
 
                                                                                                         
119 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
120 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). 
121 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he potential for unwarranted settlement pressure is a factor 
we weigh in our certification calculus.”). 
122 Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
123 See, e.g., S. REP. 109-14, at 14 (“The first such abuse involves settlements in which the attorneys 
receive excessive attorneys’ fees with little or no recovery for the class members themselves.”). 
The report goes on to outline numerous abuses of the class action device in which most of the settle-
ment proceeds went to class counsel. Id. at 15-20. 
124 See supra Part II.A. 
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While courts responded to this mistrust of plaintiffs’ attorneys by 
gradually increasing the plaintiffs’ burden at the certification stage, the 
Rules Committee responded in 2003 by adding a new subdivision, 23(g), 
which requires the trial judge to appoint class counsel following certifica-
tion.125 The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23(g) recognized that pri-
or to 2003, Rule 23(a)(4) required an inquiry into the appropriateness of 
class counsel alongside the inquiry as to the adequacy of the class repre-
sentative.126 But the new Rule 23(g) set up a framework dedicated solely 
to evaluating class counsel – leaving Rule 23(a)(4) to govern only the ap-
propriateness of the class representative.127 With Rule 23(g) now provid-
ing a framework for evaluating class counsel, there is more conceptual 
room for 23(a)(4) to address all aspects of the class representative – in-
cluding whether her claims are “typical.” This makes historic and practical 
sense. As courts have bolstered commonality and honored adequacy’s his-
toric mooring in Hansberry, typicality has shrunk in importance. To the 
extent that the typicality of the class representative’s claims is even an im-
portant metric, it should be added as a secondary concern under the 
23(a)(4) analysis.  
III.  THE  HARMFUL  EFFECTS  OF  THE    
PERSISTENCE  OF  TYPICALITY  
f typicality still served the same purpose that it did shortly after the 
1966 amendments – as a mere reinforcement of commonality and ade-
quacy – its continued presence in Rule 23 might not be problematic. After 
all, reinforcement is justifiable and desirable in the law. But after Dukes, 
Amchem, and the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, the rest of Rule 23(a) no 
longer needs reinforcing. Typicality, then, persists as a superfluous ele-
ment that requires unnecessary attention and briefing.  
Moreover, retaining typicality only leads to confusion. A recent case 
from the Northern District of California – a rare instance of a court invok-
                                                                                                         
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
126 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (2003) (“Until now, courts have scrutinized pro-
posed class counsel as well as the class representative under Rule 23(a)(4).”). 
127 See id. (“Rule 23(a)(4) will continue to call for scrutiny of the proposed class representative, while 
this subdivision will guide the court in assessing proposed class counsel as part of the certification 
decision.”). 
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ing typicality as the sole reason for denying class certification – illustrates 
the unnecessary confusion that the typicality requirement can cause.  
In Major v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., the named plaintiff, Noelle Ma-
jor, filed a putative class action against defendant Ocean Spray, claiming 
that Ocean Spray had sold drink products that “[were] improperly labeled so 
as to amount to misbranding and deception.”128 The class to be certified was 
defined as all individuals in the state of California who had purchased any of 
four categories of Ocean Spray products within the last four years.129 The 
district court denied the motion for certification because the class included 
purchasers of Ocean Spray products that Major herself had never purchased, 
thereby rendering Major’s claims atypical of those of the class.130 
After this decision, Major filed a second motion for class certification, 
seeking to cure the typicality defect by restricting the allegations regarding 
defective labels to Ocean Spray’s 100% Juice blends.131 Ocean Spray’s 
brief in opposition to the second motion dedicated nearly ten pages to dis-
crediting Major’s claims that she relied on statements in Ocean Spray’s 
claims on its labels.  
Ocean Spray maintained that Major did not meet the typicality burden 
because she could not show that she was misled by the allegedly defective 
labels, nor could she show that the Ocean Spray products indeed had added 
sugar.132 Ocean Spray also discussed ascertainability alongside the typicality 
requirement, describing the implicit requirement as “an integral part of 
typicality, predominance and manageability.”133 It cited as proof of lack of 
ascertainability that Major had “no documentary evidence that she ever 
purchased any Ocean Spray 100% Juice product.”134 This statement would 
easily fit into a commonality or adequacy analysis. And because those ele-
ments have clearer, better-defined standards, they are better grounds than 
typicality to defeat class certification in this case. 
                                                                                                         
128 No. 5:12-CV-03067 EJD, 2013 WL 2558125, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2013). 
129 Id. at *2. 
130 Id. at *4. 
131 Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Class Certification, for Appointment of Class Representative, and 
for Appointment of Class Counsel at 1, Major v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03067 
EJD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2014). 
132 See Defendant Ocean Spray’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Certify Class at 2-9, 
Major v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03067 EJD (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014). 
133 Id. at 9. 
134 Id. 
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The briefing from both sides evinces confusion surrounding the distinc-
tions among commonality, typicality, and the requirement of a definable 
class. Major’s brief, for example, repeats much of the same analysis in its 
typicality section as in its commonality and adequacy sections. It states, for 
instance, that typicality is satisfied because the determination of whether 
the single label at issue was lawful or unlawful “unquestionably” makes 
plaintiff typical of all class members.135 In her brief’s commonality section, 
Major similarly maintains that “the question of unlawfulness is a common 
question.”136 She uses this same conclusion to argue that “the claims of the 
class members and the class representatives are reasonably co-extensive,” 
and that, as a result, “there is no conflict” that would defeat adequacy of 
representation.137 
Ultimately, the court did not reach the issue of typicality on Major’s 
second motion because it granted Ocean Spray’s motion to dismiss on the 
issues that Major sought to be certified for class treatment.138 Major’s mo-
tion for class certification was therefore rendered moot.139 
Without assessing the merits of either position, the parties’ briefing il-
lustrates the confusion that occurs because of the overlap between typicali-
ty the other Rule 23 threshold requirements. The briefing shows that the 
concerns typicality is supposed to address are already covered by the more 
exacting post-Dukes commonality screen and by the lack of conflicts of in-
terest required under the adequacy analysis. The requirement of an ascer-
tainable class provides additional protection. Of course, Major is an isolat-
ed example, but it is indicative of the current state of the typicality re-
quirement. 
If typicality is duplicative of other Rule 23 requirements, why should it 
be the one to be jettisoned, rather than commonality, adequacy, or defin-
ability? As shown in this paper, those other requirements – with the ex-
ception of definability – have been more consistently defined across the 
circuits and have a firmer historical basis in the Rule. Typicality differs 
                                                                                                         
135 Plaintiff’s Second Motion For Class Certification, For Appointment of Class Representative, and 
For Appointment of Class Counsel, supra note 126, at 9. 
136 Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137 Id. at 11 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982)). 
138 See Major v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-03067 EJD, 2015 WL 859491, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015). 
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from commonality. The former contemplates the interrelatedness and rel-
evance of the representative’s claims compared to those of the class, while 
the latter considers the class as a whole and requires just one common 
question that will advance the litigation. Typicality also differs from ade-
quacy of representation. The former takes a mechanical approach to ensur-
ing due process by requiring that the legal claims or defenses are sufficient-
ly similar; the latter take a more nuanced approach by examining the ca-
pacity, knowledge, enthusiasm, and potential conflicts of the class repre-
sentative. But typicality does not differ from what happens when a court 
puts commonality and adequacy together. If the underlying value of typi-
cality is to ensure that “the interests of the named representative[s] align[] 
with [those] of the class,”140 the better-established requirements of com-
monality and adequacy fully address that concern. At this point in the de-
velopment of Rule 23, it would be preferable for the Rules Committee to 
relieve courts and parties of the necessity of contorting and repeating facts 
to satisfy the now-obsolete typicality requirement. While reinforcement is 
justifiable, duplication and confusion are not. 
IV.  PROPOSALS  FOR  CHANGE  
or the foregoing reasons, a Rule change is in order. The Rules Com-
mittee first needs to recognize the superfluity of typicality. Looking to 
cases such as Falcon, Dukes, and Amchem, the Committee should 
acknowledge that the Supreme Court has determined that the Rule 
23(a)(2)–(4) requirements “merge,” and that they therefore do not neces-
sarily warrant discrete, individualized attention in every case. Lower court 
decisions have followed this prescription and do not always consider each 
of the Rule 23(a) requirements separately.141 Those that do tend to display 
repetition and confusion,142 suggesting that there is a duplicative element 
in Rule 23(a). Unlike commonality, which enforces the basic requirement 
that the class members are united by some shared question, and unlike 
                                                                                                         
140 E.g., Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). 
141 See, e.g., In re Monster Worldwide, Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 132, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(addressing the typicality and adequacy inquiries together, and noting that defendants contested 
both requirements on the same grounds).  
142 See, e.g., In re Sanofi-Aventis Sec. Litig., 293 F.R.D. 449, 454-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing 
typicality and adequacy together and acknowledging that the two inquiries overlap). 
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adequacy, which protects the due process rights of unnamed class mem-
bers, typicality does not have a firm historic or practical basis. Some courts 
tack it on to the commonality inquiry, others to adequacy of representa-
tion. Few discuss it separately or invoke it as the sole reason for denying 
class certification. These judicial trends suggest the waning significance of 
typicality and militate in favor of the Committee excising it as a stand-
alone Rule 23(a) requirement.  
Because Rule 23(g) is now entirely dedicated to the assessment of class 
counsel, the Committee should also clarify that Rule 23(a)(4) applies only 
to the appropriateness of the class representative.143 The Committee 
should direct the courts, in line with its stated intentions in the 2003 
amendments, to assess adequacy of counsel only under Rule 23(g).144 This 
shift would provide the Committee with a prime opportunity to clarify the 
requirements of Rule 23(a). Given the superfluity of Rule 23(a)(3)’s typi-
cality requirement, the Committee should blend Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule 
23(a)(4) into one requirement that addresses all issues regarding the ap-
propriateness of the named plaintiff to represent the class. This includes 
the inquiry as to whether the named plaintiff suffered the same injury or 
was subject to the same course of conduct as the unnamed class members 
(previously a typicality concern that overlapped significantly with com-
monality). It also includes inquiries as to conflicts of interest between the 
named plaintiff and the class members (traditionally an adequacy inquiry). 
It may include an inquiry as to whether the named plaintiff possesses the 
same legal claims or defenses as those of the class (previously a typicality 
inquiry). But the new rule should jettison the formal requirement that the 
named plaintiff’s claims or defenses typify those of class members. Instead, 
the rule should align itself with the rest of Rule 23 and seek to adopt a 
                                                                                                         
143 Many courts still assess the adequacy of class counsel under Rule 23(a)(4). See, e.g., id. at 454. 
But this is arguably not aligned with the Rules Committee’s intentions as stated in the Advisory 
Committee’s notes: “Rule 23(a)(4) will continue to call for scrutiny of the class representative, 
while this subdivision will guide the court in assessing proposed class counsel as part of the certifica-
tion decision.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note (2003). The only circuit court to 
directly address this issue has said that continuing to analyze class counsel under Rule 23(a)(4) is 
incorrect. See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that although 
class counsel adequacy was “traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the adequate representation 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(4),” it is now “governed by Rule 23(g),” and admonishing the district 
court for failing to apply that section). 
144 Contra Sanofi-Aventis, 293 F.R.D. at 454. 
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practical test that embodies the functional due process purposes behind the 
threshold requirements. The amended Rule 23 could look something like 
this: 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: 
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
and 
3. the named parties’ interests are sufficiently representa-
tive of those of the class that the interests of unnamed 
class members will be fairly and adequately protected. 
In using the broader term “interests,” a term already found in Rule 
23(a)(4), this revision establishes a more functional standard that recog-
nizes that the similarity of the representative’s claims is not necessarily the 
best measure of her effectiveness. The revision would also sanction the 
trend of many courts to collapse the adequacy and typicality inquiries into 
one145 and eliminate the confusion that can result from courts trying to 
separate the two.  
This revision will not solve all the problems outlined in this paper. 
Most likely, even the revised rule would overlap with commonality and 
the implicit requirement of a definable class. But it would be a step in the 
right direction and a move toward increasing the clarity and functionality 
of Rule 23(a). If the Rules Committee is to continue to meaningfully re-
spond to the shifting realities of legal practice, this revision is necessary.  
CONCLUSION  
ith the Rules Committee already considering changes to Rule 23, 
it is time to revisit the four threshold requirements to ensure that 
each of them is serving a clear purpose. Upon close scrutiny, which this 
paper sought to provide, the Rule 23(a)(3) requirement of typicality ap-
pears to do little to advance the major goals of class action litigation: effi-
ciency and fairness. With a bolstered commonality requirement, a historic 
and comprehensive adequacy of representation requirement, and the im-
                                                                                                         
145 Id. at 454; In re BP, SLC Sec. Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 428, 437-39 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Monster 
Worldwide, Inc., 251 F.R.D. at 134. 
W 
KRISTIN  MACDONNELL  
48   5  JOURNAL  OF  LAW  (2  NEW  VOICES)  
plied requirement of a definable class, there is little room for typicality to 
meaningfully contribute to the class certification decision. Its superfluity is 
underscored by recent cases that either combine the requirement with 
others or manifest confusion when attempting to define an independent 
role for it. Typicality, then, means little in modern practice and only leads 
to confusion. The Rules Committee should recognize its superfluity and 
ultimately excise the requirement. Such action would greatly improve the 
clarity of Rule 23. 
•  •  • 
 
